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Abstract
This work addresses the challenges related to attacks on collaborative tag-
ging systems, which often comes in a form of malicious annotations or profile
injection attacks. In particular, we study various countermeasures against two
types of such attacks for social tagging systems, the Overload attack and the
Piggyback attack. The countermeasure schemes studied here include baseline
classifiers such as, Naive Bayes filter and Support Vector Machine, as well as a
Deep Learning approach. Our evaluation performed over synthetic spam data
generated from del.icio.us dataset, shows that in most cases, Deep Learning
can outperform the classical solutions, providing high-level protection against
threats.
Keywords: recommender systems, collaborative tagging, folksonomies, shilling
attacks, del.icio.us
1 Introduction
Recommender Systems (RS) are information filtering mechanisms, aiming at pre-
dicting the preference of users to particular resources. Collaborative tagging, a web-
based service that is representative of the new Web 2.0 technology, allows users to
store, share and annotate various kinds of web resources, such as news, blogs, and
photos into social data repositories. Also known as Social Tagging systems, or So-
cial Bookmarking systems, such tools facilitate resource recommendations using the
annotations of the users as input to various prediction algorithms.
∗This document is an extended pre-print of short paper published in RecSys 2018 by Pitsilis
et al. (2018). Please cite that version instead (see references).
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With tags (a.k.a textual annotations) being a novel source of information, their
concept has attracted the interest of scientists, with a literature rapidly expanding
(Fernquist and Chi (2013); Heymann et al. (2008); Haustein and Peters (2012)).
The open structure and the adaptive characteristics of RS have, however, made
them vulnerable to various types of attacks. In general, the aim of an attack to a
RS is to promote or disapprove a product for the benefit of the attacker. A common
way for an attacker to achieve this is to inject malicious profiles that correspond to
fictitious identities into the system, in order to bias the system towards users being
recommended a inferior product. Like other types of recommender systems, collabo-
rative tagging has attracted the interest of attackers, aiming to distort the system’s
behavior. Such an attack can be compared to attacking an ordinary rating-based
Collaborative-filtering system in tag-based recommender systems. The existence of
these threats highlights the need for effective countermeasures for safeguarding such
systems.
Our contribution in this paper is two-fold. First, we provide a set of synthetic
data, consisting of malicious annotations to be used for testing purposes. Second,
we provide a comparative study of the effects of various attacks in a typical person-
alized tag-based RS. Along with this, we demonstrate the effectiveness of potential
countermeasures against those attacks. Those include a deep learning (DL) model
adapted to the special requirements of the issue we come to address.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe in more
detail the problem of attacks in tag-based recommender systems and describe the
types of attack addressed in this work, in correspondence with two likely system
scenarios. In Section 3, we discuss the existing work in the field. In Section 4,
we present the classical and our proposed solution for tackling the issue; while in
Section 5, we describe the dataset that we used and the evaluation we performed,
and discuss the results that we received. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize our
contributions and outline the future work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Problem Statement
In a social annotation system, the assignment of tags to resources by users is referred
to as folksonomies, which are tuples of four components: F = (U, T,R,A), where
U ,T and R are finite sets of users, tags and resources, respectively, and A denotes
a ternary relationship between them, e.g., A ⊆ U × T × R. A tag assignment
a = (u, t, r) ∈ A is an annotation of resource r by user u with tag t.
In general, an attack against a tagging system consists of one or more coordi-
nated attack profiles, with each one being associated with a fictitious user identity.
The annotation history of such an identity is designed to bias the recommendation
algorithm. With this in mind, the research question that we address in this work is:
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How effective can be the various classifier schemes in the battle against the
injection of bogus profiles, whose aim is to influence the personalized recom-
mendations received by users in a tag-based recommender system?
To answer this question, our main goals can be summarized as:
• To study various classification schemes, including deep learning, over known
types of shilling attacks.
• To evaluate the success of classification, as well as the actual effectiveness of
filtering-out any bogus folksonomies into the recommendation process.
2.2 Attacks Description
There are generally many commonalities between attacking a tag-based RS and
the phenomenon of spamming. The main focus of this work is on special forms of
attacks with interesting characteristics associated with a tag-based RS, as found in
the literature (Ramezani et al., 2009). To maintain consistency with the existing
literature, the following terminology has been used:
• Bogus resource, is an item which an attacker wishes to promote, so that users’
interest for this resource will increase.
• Popular resource, is an item or a set of items with high visibility, which the
attacker wishes to associate with the Bogus resource.
• Popular tag, is a tag of high visibility within the annotation system.
2.2.1 Overload Attack
As its name implies, the goal of this attack is to overload a tag context with a bogus
resource to achieve a correlation between the tag and that resource. To accomplish
this, an attacker would associate the bogus resource with a number of popular tags.
There are two variations of this attack, namely, Popular and Focused, with the latter
targeting on a specific subset of users called likely buyers, rather on all of them, as
in the former. We restrict this work on the Popular variation only.
2.2.2 Piggyback Attack
The objective of this attack is for the bogus resource to ride the success of another
highly reputable resource, which we call popular resource. To accomplish this, an
attacker associates the target resource with a highly reputable one, so that they
would appear similar. A way to perform this attack is to apply a tag replication
strategy of annotating the bogus resource, using any popular tags already associated
with the popular resource.
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2.2.3 System Operation Scenarios
To enhance the readers understanding about how the attacks could affect a tag-based
recommender system, in this section we discuss two likely system-level scenarios for
recommendation provision. In the first one, we call tag-based resource recommenda-
tions, the recommendations have no personalized form and are computed upon some
input keyword provided by the user to a search query. In the second one, resource
recommendations are personalized to users and are computed based on their pro-
file similarity with the various resources. Also they can be provided in a proactive
manner by the system.
Tag-based resource recommendations. In this scenario we assume that the
resource recommendation algorithm receives a small set of tags as user’s input query,
and it recommends those resources which have the largest association with the tags
in that query.
We present the following tagging scenarios, depicted in tables 1 and 2. For the
shake of our example, there exist in total three resources in the RS (Resource #1,
Resource #2, Resource #3 ), along with a set of tags chosen by various users for
annotating each resource. The (•) mark denotes the choice of a user to annotate a
particular resource with that tag. Another two resources, marked as Bogus Resource
#1 and Bogus Resource #2, are used here as examples which the attacker wishes
to promote, by applying the Overload and Piggyback attack respectively. A number
of bogus user profiles, are injected into the RS, marked in our example as, fake user
A and fake user B, and used the most popular tags to annotate the Bogus resource.
For instance, the tag ”car” was included in the attack profiles as being one of the
most frequently used in our example.
Before the attack, a prompt choice for any user who has queried the system using
a popular tag, such as ”car”, would be any of resources #1, #2 or #3. That is
because, this tag is the most frequently used for the above 3 resources.
For the case of Overload Attack, an increase by the attacker to the frequency of
an already Popular Tag, has also the result of increasing the chances for the Bogus
Resource #1 to be presented as the most prompt choice in response to a user query.
In our example (see table 1), suppose that after the attack, a user is querying the
RS using the same tag (”car”). This time he would be recommended by the system
to choose Bogus Resource #1 as the most prompt option. The reason for that is
simply because the tag ”car” after the attack has turned into the most frequently
used annotation than before, thus becoming the most highly associated with the
bogus resource.
For the Piggyback attack, we assume that Resource #1 is the most popular one,
as soon as there is six tags in total (that is the largest number) that have been used
for its annotation (indicated in sum column in table 2). As per the attack’s design,
an intruder would apply a tag duplication strategy, aiming to associate his/her Bogus
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Table 1: Overload attack example resource-tag matrix
Tag used → dog food power car web
Resource ↓ User ↓ sum
Resource #1
Alice •
Bob • •
David • • •
sum 1 2 1 1 1 6
Resource #2
Bob •
David • •
sum 1 1 0 1 0 3
Resource #3
Alice • •
Clark • •
sum 1 0 1 1 1 4
Bogus Resource #1
fake user A • •
fake user B • •
sum 1 1 0 2 0
Table 2: Piggyback attack example resource-tag matrix
Tag used → dog food power car web
Resource ↓ User ↓ sum
Resource #1
Alice •
Bob • •
David • • •
sum 1 2 1 1 1 6
Resource #2
Bob •
David • •
sum 1 1 0 1 0 3
Resource #3
Alice • •
Clark • •
sum 1 0 1 1 1 4
Bogus Resource #2
fake user C • • •
fake user D • •
sum 1 2 0 2 0
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Resource #2 with Resource #1 (Target item), in such a way that they would appear
similarly annotated. To achieve that, he would create a number of attack profiles
(such as: fake users C and D), and annotate the Bogus Resource #2, using any
popular tags already used for the annotation of the popular Resource #1, such as,
”car” or ”food”. As a result of this, querying the recommender system with any
popular tag associated with Resource #1 (e.g ”car”), would result to Bogus Resource
#2 been recommended, rather Resource #1. That is because, a consequence of the
attack is that ”car” becomes the most highly associated tag with the Bogus resource
#2 (annotated twice using that tag vs just once for Resource #1 ), and thus emerged
into the prompt option.
Similarity-Based recommendations. In the second system-level scenario, the
generated recommendations are entirely personalized, and are built upon the com-
puted similarity between the users and the resources.
The two types of attacks detailed in the previous paragraph can be adapted to
the Similarity-based recommendation scheme as follows. We take the previously
mentioned scheme composed of five resources in total (non-fake and fake ones),
namely Resource #1, Resource #2, Resource #3 and Bogus Resource #1, Bogus
Resource #2, respectively, along with four legitimate users, Alice, Bob, Clark, David,
and two fakes ones, fake user C, fake user D. The objective of the attack in this
scenario is the fake product to potentially become highly similar to normal users,
thus emerging into a prompt option for them.
For computing such user-resource similarity, it is necessary that users’ profiles
and resources can be converted into vectors. Various features, such as, the frequen-
cies of tags derived from the annotation history of users, can serve in such case as
the elementary information to compute the dot product of those vectors. There is
a plethora of algorithms suitable for expressing such vector similarity, such as, Eu-
cledian (O’Neill, 2006), Jaccard (Hamers et al., 1989), Vector Space (Salton et al.,
1975), with the latter being the best suited to such requirement. Vector Space is a
legacy recommendation algorithm for tag-based RS, which can be used for the provi-
sion of personalized resource recommendations to users (Gemmell et al., 2012). This
algorithm employs Cosine similarity which is a form of correlation that combines the
tag frequencies. We refer to this model in more detail in section 5 below.
To get some insight into the effects of the attacks in the above similarity-based
scenario in accordance to the example presented in tables 1 and 2, we point out that
while before the attack the prompt options for some legitimate users, such as, Bob
and Clark would be very likely to choose Resource #2 (Sim[Bob,Res#2] = 0.668
and Sim[Clark,Res#2] = 0.820) (as per eqn. 2), for the same users, after the at-
tack, Bogus Resource #1 becomes the top recommended option, due to its high sim-
ilarity with them (Sim[Bob,Bog Res#1] = 0.708 and Sim[Clark,Bog Res#1] =
0.868 respectively).
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Next, we refer to the best known solutions for tolerating attacks in RS, and then
we present our approach along with a demonstration of the achieved performance
in accordance to the Similarity-Based recommendation scenario.
3 Related Work
The issue of security in tag-based RS in not new, but it has so far been mainly
approached by solutions associated with spam detection. As per Heymann et al.
(2007), anti-spam approaches in social networks are divided into 3 main categories:
a) Prevention mechanisms, such as CAPTCHAs (von Ahn et al., 2003), b) Rank-
based approaches which demote spam in search queries, and c) Identification-based
solutions which aim to detect and isolate any potentially threatening entities, such
as a user or a resource. The focus of our work is on the latter type only.
To filter out non-legitimate users, various anti-spamming techniques have been
developed by numerous researchers in the field, employing either a form of Bayesian
type filtering (Yazdani et al., 2012), or other tag classification methods (Koutrika
et al., 2007). Particular characteristics of the tags used in annotations are exhibited,
such as the presence of suspicious ones into user profiles. In the above works the
assumption made is that, any tags used by a legitimate user would coincide with
those by other legitimate users. Nevertheless, if attackers are aware of the correla-
tions being used in an attack filtering policy, they might try to disguise their fake
profiles by using non-suspicious tags (Koutrika et al., 2007; Yazdani et al., 2012). In
such a case, any spam tag filtering is turned ineffective.
Zhai et al. (2016) have developed a spam detection mechanism based on the user-
behavior, that employs criteria such as the neighbors’ honesty within the group,
which the user is member of. A similar filtering approach by Poorgholami et al.
(2013) mixes features of tags and users together in the spam classification, that in-
clude the spamicity for tags from Baysian classification along with some user features
derived from the social connectivity.
Neural network-based approaches, including deep learning (DL), are known to
provide a good level of protection for the general task of spam detection in emails
or social posts (Jain et al., 2017). However, despite the plethora of solutions ex-
isting today for spam classification, there is still a need for alternative and modern
approaches, such as DL. To the best of our knowledge, DL has not been adequately
investigated so far as a good solution to prevent attacks in tag-based RS, nor have
quantifiable results been provided to demonstrate how the effectiveness of the coun-
termeasures is reflected to the recommendation output.
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4 Securing the folksonomies
In this section we briefly describe the three supervised learning classification algo-
rithms that we included in our comparative study.
4.1 Naive Bayes filtering
Naive Bayes is known to be very effective for binary classification of emails in order
to detect spam. To detect attacks, we applied Naive Bayes filtering for classifying
folksonomies, based on the existence of tags in them. More specifically, we used the
well-known formula derived from the Bayes theorem (Sahami et al., 1998).
For the case of detecting a fake folksonomy that was maliciously injected into the
system, it works as follows. For every folksonomy composed of N tags we calculate
the probability of being fake as: p = 11+en , where n =
∑N
i=1[ln(1− pi)− ln pi], in
which: pi is the conditional probability that the folksonomy is fake, given that it
contains tag i.
4.2 Support Vector Machine (SVM)
Among the various classification schemes, SVM has gained increased popularity in
the recent years, and its suitability for binary classification tasks (Stanevski and
Tsvetkov, 2005) in NLP applications, is the main reason for the inclusion in this
study.
We chose the linear kernel function for SVM for separating the input folk-
sonomies into two classes, legitimate and malicious. The choice of that kernal func-
tion was driven by the fact that it gave the best results in the classification task,
compared to other functions such as RBF, Polynominal and sigmoid. Squared Hinge
was the loss function used. To apply this on our dataset, the input folksonomies
were vectorized, before the classification. Vectorization is necessary for building a
vocabulary of tags used in the folksonomies, so that each folksonomy is encoded as
a fixed-length vector. Then, the tags in the vocabulary were transformed into TF-
IDF values (Salton and Buckley, 1988). TF-IDF expresses the importance of a tag
based on how often it appears in that particular folksonomy, in relation to the whole
dataset. In our case the values are computed by: tfidf(t, d,D) = tf(td)× idf(t,D),
with tf(t, d) = |dt||d| and idf(t,D) = ln
D
Dt
, where D denotes as the total number of
folksonomies in the set, Dt the number of folksonomies containing the tag t, |dt| the
frequency of appearance of tag t in folksonomy d ∈ D. The above transformation
was necessary in our case, to scale down the impact of the most frequent tags found
in the dataset.
Speaking in terms of SVM classification, the challenge is to find a hyperplane of
(n − 1) dimension for folksonomy data expressed in n dimension feature space, so
that to segregate the bogus from the legitimate class of folksonomies. In our case,
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the number of features (n) is determined by the number of different tags exist in the
corpus. The above challenge of finding a hyperplane is expressed by:
n∑
i=1
wi · xi + bo = 0 (1)
where: xi in our case is a folksonomy expressed as element of n-dimentional feature
space as: ~x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rn, bo 6= 0, wi and bo are chosen based on the training
data. Based on that, elements xi ∈ Rn which reside above the hyperplane would
satisfy: ~b·~x+bo > 0, therefore they would be considered as members of the legitimate
class, while those that satisfy ~b · ~x + bo < 0 would be the bogus ones.
4.3 Deep Learning (DL)
We used a classification model, which employs a Long-Short-Term-Memory (LSTM)-
based (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997), Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) algo-
rithm. This hybrid model has the strong benefit of working both with and without
sequential data, and it is composed of four layers (see also Figure 1):
i) An input layer. (a.k.a Embedding layer), the size of which is associated
with the size of the vocabulary of tags (corpus) used in the folksonomies, and it was
set to 25.
ii) A hidden layer., which is fully connected to the input and the subsequent
layer. The dimensionality of the output space for this layer was set to 200 based on
preliminary results.
iii) A dense layer, used for improving the learning and stabilize the output,
with size equal to that of the input folksonomy. The ReLU activation function was
chosen for this layer (Hahnloser et al., 2000), filtering the output as: f(x) = x+ =
max(0, x).
iv) The output layer, which has 2 neurons to provide the classification output
in the form of probabilities, for the Legitimate and Bogus class. For this layer, the
softmax activation function was chosen, with the second output value as such being
the complement of the first one.
For embedding the input data into the model in a proper form, such as vectors,
it requires applying the proper pre-processing onto the folksonomies, such as, word-
based frequency vectorization. That is, the tags in the dataset are indexed based on
their frequency of appearance in the folksonomies. In this way, a unique identifier is
allocated to each tag and used as vector element to describe a folksonomy. For the
case of del.icio.us dataset we used in our experiment we chose to apply a fixed vector
size of 50 tags to represent folksonomies, which means, any smaller folksonomies had
to be padded with zeroes to reach that size, while the longer ones where truncated
to be no longer than 50 tags.
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Figure 1: The deep learning model architecture used
5 Evaluation
In order to demonstrate the effects of the attacks on the recommendation output, we
implemented the second system-level scenario we mention in section 2.2.3 for gen-
erating personalized, similarity-based recommendations. We focus on this scenario
only, for two reasons. First, because it is more realistic, and second for its higher
scientific importance.
For the evaluation we employed the Vector Space model for producing recom-
mendations. As the name implies, Vector Space similarity is employed for computing
the distance between a user’s and an resource’s vector, Each user is represented by
a tag vector u = [wt1, wt2, ..., wtn] with wt denoting the weight of the particular
tag t on that user. Vector weights may be expressed through many ways, with the
frequency of tags being the most common. Likewise, each resource can be modeled
as a vector r = [ut1, ut2, ..., utn] over the same set of tags. Next, the users profiles
and the resources can be matched over those tag expressions and compute the simi-
larity value between them. Cosine Similarity can be used to obtain these similarity
scores between user profiles and rated resources. Then, by sorting the similarities
in descending order we can eventually compile a top-k list of personalized recom-
mendations of resources for a specific user. The cosine of the two vectors in eqn.2
is derived from the Eucledian dot product formula, with ||~tn|| denote as the length
of the vector tn, and ~tu · ~tr is the inner product of a user vector ~tu and a resource
vector ~tr.
cos(~t1, ~t2) =
~t1 · ~t2
||~t1|| ||~t2||
(2)
For our particular case, we further adapted the above model into the needs
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of folksonomy-based Social Tagging systems. First, we express every tag in the
corpus in the form of a word2vec vector (Mikolov et al., 2013), extracted from a
pre-trained set by Google. Next, for every folksonomy posted by a user we derive
a single word2vec representation by averaging the existing word2vec values of all
tags in that folksonomy. Extending this to the user level, the word2vec vectors of
the folksonomies by that user can be averaged and finally receive a single vector
representation of that user profile. The above formula can work similarly for rep-
resenting the resources as word2vec vectors. Finally, the similarity between a user
and a resource can be worked out by computing the Cosine Similarity value be-
tween their word2vec vectors, that actually provides the distance that is necessary
to know for compiling the personalized top-k lists. Computing the similarity on the
word2vec values was also found useful to avoiding issues related to cold-start users or
resources. That is, any lacking of common tags in the annotation histories of a user
and a resource would not make possible to compute the cosine similarity between
them otherwise.
5.1 Dataset
We chose to evaluate our hypothesis using annotation data from del.isio.us1, a pub-
lic dataset of folksonomies. To reduce processing time, for every run we selected
randomly subsets of folksonomies corresponding to 3.000 users. As opposed to other
researchers who used pre-labeled datasets with spam data (e.g., Yazdani et al. (2012);
Poorgholami et al. (2013); Zhai et al. (2016)), in our case, due to the absence of such
bogus data we chose to evaluate over synthetic ones, we generated out of the original.
Moreover, this enabled us to study exclusive cases of attacks.
The size of the bogus folksonomies, as well as the tag selection, were determined
according to the guidelines that we found in the literature (Ramezani et al., 2009)
concerning the Overload and Piggyback attacks2. As such, to simulate the former,
the tags of fake folksonomies were chosen out of the 75 most popular ones used
in the legitimate folksonomies, while the max size of the fake folksonomies was
limited to 50 tags. The Popular tags were selected from those used for annotating
the most popular resources. To determine the actual number of tags to include
in a fake folksonomy, we studied the distribution of the frequencies of tags in the
legitimate folksonomies in the original dataset (del.icio.us), and we build bogus ones
with size that follows the same distribution. In addition, for the Piggyback attack,
the tags we used for building the fake folksonomies were chosen out of those used
in the 100 most highly annotated resources in the dataset. This above value was
chosen as being suitable, given the sparsity of del.isio.us dataset. The distribution
of tags in the original dataset, as well as in a randomly selected sample of synthetic
1Del.isio.us dataset acquired from the work in Basile et al. (2015).
2The code as well as the dataset of bogus profiles will be available at the following address:
https://github.com/gpitsilis/SecuringTagBasedrecSys
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Figure 2: The distribution of tags in the original del.isio.us dataset along with the
synthetic bogus data. DKL(Porg||Qovl) = 0.00481 and DKL(Porg||Qpig) = 0.00496
where Porg, Qolv, Qpig the legitimate, overload and piggyback distributions respec-
tively.
Table 3: Statistics of our del.isio.us dataset.
Statistics of dataset del.isio.us
# folksonomies 73k
# users 3k
# unique tags (corpus) 42k
fake folksonomies we used for the Overload and Piggyback attacks is shown in fig.
2. We computed the Kullback-Leibler divergence value for discrete distributions of
all classes, as per equation: DKL(P ||Q) =
∑
i
P (i) log(Q(i)P (i)), by Kullback (1987).
We used as input the normalized values of the frequencies of tags classes, and we
noticed that there is indeed low divergence between the probability distributions of
the original and the bogus folksonomies.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
To demonstrate the impact of attacks, we chose to adopt a set of approved metrics
from the literature (Ramezani et al., 2009).
For the Overload attack we used the following:
• F-Score for the spam classification process. That is the harmonic mean of
precision and recall, expressed as: F = 2·P ·RP+R . Precision (P) is the ratio of the
number of folksonomies correctly classified as belonging to the fake class, over
12
the total number of folksonomies classified as fake, while Recall (R), measures
the ratio of folksonomies correctly classified as fake over the whole population
of fake folksonomies.
• The Average rank in which the bogus resource appears in the users’ top-k lists
of recommended resources.
• The population affected by the attack, i.e., the number of users for whom the
bogus resource has been recommended. That refers to whom the bogus re-
source has been included in their top-k lists of personalized recommendations.
For the Piggyback attack, the last metric refers to the population of users for
whom the bogus resource has been ranked higher than the popular one in the top-k
recommendations they received.
5.3 Experimental Setup
For training the classifiers over the class of bogus data, a fix ratio of fake synthetic
folksonomies was appended to the dataset, corresponding to 30% of the total number
of the legitimate ones. This value was chosen as being quite realistic for sufficiently
training the classifiers and yet making possible to appropriately demonstrate the
effects of the attacks. The reason for choosing the same ratio of fake folksonomies
allover the training process, was because we aimed to test the classification mecha-
nism itself with regard to the size of bogus data been injected, rather than the effect
of the bogus data on the training process. As such, for testing each classification
scheme, we chose to test over a variable size of attack. This variable refers to the
ratio of fake folksnomies injected into the system, over the total number of legitimate
folksonomies, and it ranged from 0.1% to 10%. Every experimental setup was run
for 5 times, and the results were averaged.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of each classification algorithm, the task of
producing top-k recommendations was carried out both before and after applying
a countermeasure in the classification process. This means that, for each setup the
synthetic fake folksonomies we generated, were mixed together with the legitimate
ones from the original dataset, and then supplied into the Vector Space model to
compile the top-k resource recommendations for each user.
The evaluation process can be explained as follows: Let S be the set of all
folksonomies in the dataset, L the originally legitimate, and B the synthetically
generated bogus ones, such that: S = L∪B. Let f be the classifier to be evaluated
receiving the above two sets L,B as input. The classification output is composed
of two sets Lc, Bc = f(L,B), in which Lc = LL ∪ BL and Bc = LB ∪ BB. LL,BL
denote as the subsets of L and B respectively, which the classifier determined as
”legitimate”, and LB , BB denote as the subsets of L and B respectively, classified
as ”bogus”. Finally, the filtered output from the classifier Lc is fed into the prediction
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algorithm to compute the accuracy of the classifier with respect to the contents of
the top-k lists determined by the Vector Space algorithm.
For all three filtering algorithms we tested, we performed 10-fold cross validation
over the dataset, in which the 9 folds were used for training and the remaining one
for testing the algorithm on unseen data. The k value that determines the size of
the top-k lists was set to 15.
We implemented the DL model in Keras toolkit (Chollet, 2015), and used the
ADAM optimization algorithm (Kingma and Ba, 2014). The categorical cross-
entropy was the learning objective chosen. The size of the corpus, which is the
number of different tags used in the sample folksonomies in our dataset, was set to
42k.
Furthermore, we chose to model the input folksonomy (see fig. 1), in the form
of vectors using word-based frequency vectorization. In other words, the tags in the
corpus were indexed based on their frequency of appearance in the corpus and the
index value of each word was used as vector element to describe the folksonomy.
Finally, the DL model was allowed to run for a number of epochs until reaching
an optimally trained state. That state is reached when the validation accuracy is
maximized, while at the same time the error remains within ±1% of the lower ever
figure within that fold throughout the cross validation.
5.4 Results and Discussion
We present the most interesting results of our experimentation. As can be seen
in Table 4, which shows the classifiers’ performance expressed in F-score, the DL
approach outperforms the other approaches in classifying the bogus folksonomies for
both attacks. The above metric refers exclusively to the ability of the classifier to
detect the bogus profiles, and therefore it is independent of the size of attack.
Table 4: Classification accuracy for both attacks
Type of attack Classifier → SVM BAYES DL
Overload
F-score (overall) 0.9501 0.8339 0.9570
F-score (legit) 0.9665 0.9082 0.9709
F-score (bogus) 0.8958 0.5863 0.9104
Piggyback
F-scores (overall) 0.9680 0.9009 0.9728
F-score (legit) 0.97888 0.93878 0.9818
F-score (bogus) 0.9319 0.7748 0.9426
As far as the performance in the recommendation service itself, the population
affected by the attack is shown in the top parts of Figures 3 and 4, while the rank
of bogus resource, shown in the bottom parts of the same figures, refers to any users
who have been affected by the attack. As can be seen, very interestingly, even attacks
of small scale are sufficient to render a significant population of users vulnerable. In
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Figure 3: Results for Overload attack showing the affected population (top - small
values indicate strong resistance) and the rank of bogus resource (bottom - large
values indicate strong resistance)
fact, the DL approach, in comparison to the other alternatives, provides in general,
good resistance in preventing the intrusion of bogus resources into the users top-k
lists. That seems to be the case for both types of attacks. Also interesting is the fact
that in terms of the Avg. Rank of the Bogus resource, DL scales better for large sizes
of attacks, in comparison to Bayes classifier, which seems to perform best for small
attacks only. (See fig. 3, bottom). For the same metric in the piggyback attack,
DL despite being the second best performing, the achieved performance improves
with the increase of the attack size, as opposed to Bayes classifier, in which the
performance is diminishing.
Comparing the effects of the Overload attack vs the Piggyback attack, we observe
that in terms of the affected population, there is higher impact in the former attack,
than in the second one. More specifically, as can be seen in the top sections of fig.3
and fig.4, for No-classifier results, the affected population ranges from 30.5 to 33.5
for the Overload attack, while for the Piggyback attack it ranges just from 25.9 to
33. This observation is in line with other researches in the field by Ramezani et al.
(2008), even though expressed in different metrics.
15
20 
22 
24 
26 
28 
30 
32 
34 
0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 1% 2% 10%P o
p u
l a
t i o
n  
a f
f e
c t
e d
 b
y  
t h
e  
a t
t a
c k
 ( %
)
Size of attack
No Classifier
SVM
BAYES
D-L
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
3.5 
4.0 
4.5 
5.0 
5.5 
0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 1% 2% 10%
A v
e r
a g
e  
R a
n k
 o
f  B
o g
u s
 r e
s o
u r
c e
Size of attack
No Classifier
SVM
BAYES
D-L
Figure 4: Results for Piggyback attack showing the users population in which the
bogus resource has ranked higher than the popular one (top - small values indi-
cate strong resistance), and its actual rank (bottom - large values indicate strong
resistance).
To enhance understanding on the benefits received by the application of coun-
termeasures, we present additional results in fig. 5, showing the increase in the rank
of the bogus item achieved by each classification scheme, as well as the average re-
duction in the affected population. The improvement by each classification method
is expressed in relation to applying no countermeasures at all.
As opposed to our previous observation regarding the effects of the attacks, when
it comes to the countermeasures, the Overload attack can be tolerated more easily
than the Piggyback attack (see top parts of fig. 5). The only exception is the Bayes
classifier showing unstable behaviour.
In general, in terms of the increase of the rank of the bogus item in the top-k lists
as result to the application of countermeasures, we observe that in the Piggyback
attack they are more effective, than they are on the Overload attack. The SVM clas-
sifier totally fails to provide any benefit over the application of no countermeasures
for the piggyback attack as long as, on average, the bogus item appears at higher
rank than the target item.
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Figure 5: Comparative results for both attacks, showing the gain of applying each
countermeasure vs applying no classification policy, expressed in avg. reduction of
affected population by the attack, and avg. rank increase of bogus item.
In conclusion, as we observed, the SVM and Bayes classifiers seem to behave
best in one type of attack only, while DL being not the best in both, it yet provides
a stable and fairly good resistance throughout any type and size of attack.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we investigated the impact of spam filtering on resource recommenda-
tion in tag-based RS. To simulate two known attacks, we generated synthetic fake
folksonomies from original data, taken from del.isio.us dataset. Our experiments
showed that the deep learning model outperformed all the legacy classifiers in terms
of F-score and, in most cases, it can safeguard the user recommendations.
For future work, we plan to further improve the filtering performance by in-
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vestigating other deep learning architectures, as well as experimenting with feature
extraction from folksonomy data to feed the neural network. In addition, we intend
to further generalize the results by exploring more resource annotation datasets, as
well as performing extensive comparative studies.
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